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PROTECTION FOR TRADE SECRETS UNDER 
THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT OF 
1978 
In 1976, after several years of considering proposed legislation, 1 
Congress enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).2 
The purposes of the TSCA are two-fold. One is to regulate the 
manufacture and use of chemical substances3 which are danger-
ous to health or the environment.• The other is to compile a 
comprehensive catalogue of the chemical substances produced 
and distributed in the United States.5 In order to facilitate 
achievement of these objectives, a division was established in the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with the authority to 
collect information on chemical substances.• 
1 The need for such legislation was first expressed in a report by the Council on Environ-
mental Quality in 1971. In 1972, 1973, and 1975 the House and Senate each passed 
legislation regulating toxic substances, but the two bodies could not agree on major provi-
sions. The primary roadblock to this legislation in 1972 and 1973 was the question of the 
extent of the EPA's authority to require screening and testing before marketing. The 
Senate preferred a more restrictive bill while the House was more sympathetic to industry 
and would have required much less testing. The TSCA represents a compromise position. 
For a general history of toxic substance legislation, see Crewdson, Toxic Substance Con-
troversy Continues, 34 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 13 (1976); Crewdson, Toxic Substance 
Control, 34 CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 706 (1976); Crewdson, Toxic Substances, 34 CONG. Q. 
WEEKLY REP. 764 (1976). 
• Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976)). Under the TSCA, each time a company decides to manu-
facture or process a new chemical substance, the company must give notice of its intent 
and request permission from the EPA. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (1976). The company must also 
submit data showing that it believes the manufacture, distribution, and use of the new 
substance will not present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment. 
Id. § 2604(b). The Administrator for Toxic Substances may require that the company 
conduct additional tests on any chemical that will have substantial human exposure, or 
about the effects of which there are insufficient data. Id. § 2603(a). · 
' A chemical substance as defined in TSCA is "any organic or inorganic substance of a 
particular molecular identity, including-(i) any combination of such substances occur-
ring in whole or in part as a result of a chemical reaction or occurring in nature, and (ii) 
any element or uncombined radical." 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(A) (1976). The definition does 
not include any pesticide, tobacco product, nuclear material, food, food additive, drug, 
comestic, or device, all of which are regulated by other specific legislation. Id. §2602(2)(B). 
'Id. § 2605. 
' Id. § 2607(b). 
' U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of the Assistant Administrator for 
Toxic Substances, established by 40 C.F.R. § 1.36 (1979). 
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A vital part of the toxic substances regulatory scheme involves 
the voluntary submission of data to the Toxic Substances Divi-
sion of the EPA by the chemical industry. This scheme, however, 
creates a conflict between the EPA's need for information and 
industry's need to protect trade secrets and confidential business 
information. Often the information that is required to be submit-
ted by TSCA is crucial to the competitive position of a firm 
developing a new chemical. The TSCA provides protection for 
this confidential information in order to encourage industry to 
comply with the reporting requirements.7 . 
This article will examine the protection provided by the Act 
and the measures the EPA has adopted for implementing the 
Act's provisions. The approach will be to focus on the different 
functional areas in which disclosure may take place. Part I exam-
ines the scheme for designating information as confidential and 
the mechanics of the reporting system under TSCA. Part II deals 
with disclosures of confidential information made while imple-
menting the TSCA. Part ID focuses on legal disclosures of infor-
mation submitted as confidential. Finally, Part N examines the 
measures taken within the EPA to guarantee the safety of confi-
dential information, the penalties for persons illegally disclosing 
such confidential information, and the remedies for an affected 
business. 
l. DESIGNATION & IDENTIFICATION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
UNDER THE TSCA 
A. Congressional Response to the Role of Trade Secrets in the 
Chemical Industry 
While the primary purpose of the TSCA is to provide for collec-
tion of information so that dangerous chemicals may be more 
carefully regulated,8 a secondary purpose is to make this informa-
tion readily available to the public' so that Americans may have 
7 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3) (1976). The interference with research and development was 
the major stumbling block to all previous toxic substance legislation. Dow Chemical 
Company predicted that the additional testing would cost the chemical industry about 
$2 billion per year. The Manufacturing Chemists Association predicted a cost to industry 
of between $360 million and $1.3 billion per year with $100 million in start-up costs. 
Crewdson, Toxic Substance Controversy Continues, 34 CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 13, 17 
(1976). The EPA and General Accounting Office (GAO), on the other hand, predicted 
costs to industry of between $80 and $200 million per year. The EPA and GAO estimates 
havt: proven to be much closer to reality than the industry figures. Epstein, Polluted Data, 
THE SCIENCES 16, 18 (July/Aug. 1978). 
• 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (1976). 
• See Toxic Substances Control Act: Hearings on H.R. 7229, H.R. 7548, and H.R. 7664 
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a better idea of the chemicals to which they are continuously 
exposed.10 Section 5(d) of the TSCA requires the Administrator 
of the EPA to publish the names and uses of every chemical 
substance manufactured or processed in the United States on an 
inventory in the Federal Register. 11 
The chemical industry objected to the automatic inclusion of 
each substance's name on the list, claiming that simple publica-
tion of a substance's name can be damaging to the producer's 
competitive position. Members of the industry said that publica-
tion of even a generic name could reveal that the substance is 
being manufactured or at least considered for sale, facts the pro-
ducing company might want to keep secret until its sales cam-
paign has been prepared. 12 It was argued that publication of the 
fact of manufacture would discourage innovation because the 
competitive advantage of being the first to develop a new chemi-
cal substance would be severely diminished or altogether lost. 13 
Proponents of publication said that patents could be used to pro-
tect all new chemical developments. 14 The chemical industry re-
sponded that patents do not apply to foreign chemical manufac-
turers and so would provide no protection outside the United 
States. 15 Moreover, the confidential business and commercial in-
formation which might be included on the inventory is unlikely 
to be protected by patents. 18 
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on 
· Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 352-55 (1975) (statement of Anita 
Johnson, Public Citizen's Health Research Group, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited 
as Hearings on H.R. 7229, H.R. 7548, and H.R. 7664). 
•• See notes 19-21 and accompanying text infra. See also articles cited in note 1 supra. 
11 This provision reads in pertinent part: · 
[T)he Administrator shall publish in the Federal Register a notice which-
(A) identifies the chemical substance for which notice or data has been re-
ceived; 
(~) lists the uses or intended uses of sm;h substance; and 
(C) ... describes the nature of the tests performed on such substance and 
any data which was developed pursuant to subsection (b) of this section or rule 
under section 2603 of this title. 
15 U.S.C. § 2604(d)(2) (1976). 
12 Hearings on H.R. 7229, H.R. 7548, and H.R. 7664, supra note 9, at 449-50 (letter from 
Ralph Engel, Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Assoc., Inc.); id. at 474 (letter from J.P. 
St. Clair, Shell Oil Co.). 
II Id. 
14 Toxic Substances Control Act: Hearings on S. 776 Before the Subcomm. on the Envi-
ron. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., let Sess., Pt. 1, 171 (1975) (state-
ment of Dr. Albert Fritsch, Center for Science in the Public Interest) [hereinafter cited 
as Hearings on S. 776). 
11 Id. Pt. 2, 119 (statement of Orin Smith, M&T Chemical Co.). 
11 Under federal patent law, "[w)hoever invents or discovers any new and useful pro-
cess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements 
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In response to the industry's arguments, environmentalists and 
public health groups maintained that it would defeat the purpose 
of the TSCA to allow companies to "hide" information behind a 
"confidential" designation. 17 They said that the effectiveness of 
the inventory would be decreased if some chemicals were ex-
cluded and they were concerned that public sector scientists such 
as academicians, physicians, and environmentalists be given an 
opportunity to aid and review the EPA in data evaluation.'8 
of this title." 35 U .S.C. § 101 (1976). The following definitions are included in the statute: 
"(a) The term "invention" means invention or discovery. (b) The term "process" means 
process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, 
composition of matter, or material." 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1976). Clearly, confidential business 
or commercial information would not fit any of the categories listed in 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
Furthermore, methods of bookkeeping and transacting business have long been held to 
be nonpatentable. In re Patton, 127 F.2d 324 (C.C.P.A. 1942); Conover v. Coe, 99 F.2d 
377 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 
1908). 
" Earlier versions of toxic substances legislation incorporated 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), 
which provides protection from disclosure not only for trade secrets, but also "processes, 
operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, 
amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, 
partnership, corporation, or association." The industry preferred this broad coverage, but 
it was argued that "this language goes far beyond the Freedom of Information Act. It 
would . . . destroy the Agency's power to release material when necessary for public 
health." Hearings on H.R. 7229, H.R. 7548, and H.R. 7664, supra note 9, at 353 (statement 
of Anita Johnson). See id. at 88 (statement of Anthony Mazzochi, Oil, Chemical and 
Atomic Workers International Union). See also notes 155-56 and accompanying text infra. 
18 Opponents of the confidential designation argued that 
[i]f you are secreting health and safety studies, you are not able to get the 
opinions of outside scientists. If the data is open, graduate students can come in 
and examine it, they can write articles on the data, professors . . . and profes-
sional societies could come in and exmaine data. EPA, being understaffed as it 
is, desperately needs all the scientific comment that it can get. That is, data 
would essentially sit in EPA's files waiting for EPA to get around to doing some-
thing about it unless it were open to the public. 
Hearings on H.R. 7229, H.R. 7548, and H.R. 7664, supra note 9, at 352 (statement of Anita 
Johnson). 
This argument presupposes that the testing done by industry and the review of that 
testing by the EPA will be ineffective to catch potentially hazardous substances. But 
whenever the EPA Administrator determines that the completed tests do not adequately 
prove a substance's safety, he may order additional tests done by either the submitting 
company or an independent contractor of the EPA. While it is possible that the EPA will 
become so overburdened that it will /not be able to perform adequate analyses and will 
not realize that more tests are needed, the detailed information required to be submitted 
for each new chemical should make this determination relatively routine. There is no 
evidence that the Toxic Substances Division will be unable to handle the volume of data 
it receives, or that there will be need for checks by public sector scientists. In light of the 
uncertain and rather haphazard protection such "public sector" checks could provide, this 
is not a compelling reason for disclosure. But see Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and 
the Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 29 PUB. Ao. REv. 346 (1969), where the author 
suggests that sufficient redundancy can make a system more reliable than any of its parts. 
More importantly, such publication would be available to private sector scien-
tists-those employed by competitors of the submitting company. This poses such a threat 
WINTER 1980] Trade Secret Protection 333 
The proponents of a complete listing were chiefly concerned 
that information from health and safety studies be available to 
the public. 19 These studies include "any study of any effect of a 
chemical substance or mixture on health or the environment or 
on both, including ... studies of occupational exposure to a 
chemical substance or mixture, toxicological, clinical, and ecolog-
ical studies of a chemical substance or mixture . . . . " 20 In the 
past, results of such tests had often been hidden by the develop-
ing company until the damage to health or the environment was 
too visible to be kept secret. 21 
To ensure the effectiveness of the TSCA, it was necessary for 
Congress to strike a balance between the industry's desire for 
broad secrecy and environmentalists' desire for total disclosure. 
The TSCA reflects this balance by allowing industry to designate 
information it believes to be trade secrets for confidential treat-
ment, but not allowing health and safety studies to be con-
cealed.22 The Administrator for Toxic Substances may disclose 
to the competitive positions of submitting companies that Congress decided ·to strike the 
balance in favor of non-disclosure in order to ensure industry compliance with the report-
ing requirements of the TSCA. 
11 Hearings on H.R. 7229, H.R. 7548, and H.R. 7664, supra note 9, at 352 (statement of 
Anita Johnson); Hearings on S. 776, supra note 14, at 168-69 (statement of Dr. Sidney 
Wolfe, Health Research Group). 
In the 1975 bill before Congress, H.R. 7229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (1975), these 
health and safety studies would have received protection under the trade secret designa-
tion. TSCA § 14 requires the Administrator to release all health and safety information 
which does not disclose processes used in manufacture or the portions of any chemical 
substances in a protected mixture. 15 U.S.C. § 2613 (1976). See Hearings on S. 776, supra 
note 14, at 178 (statement of Jacqueline Warren, Environmental Defense Fund). 
zo 15 u.s.c. § 2602 (6) (1976). 
21 Epstein, supra note 7. For example, Allied Chemical Company suppressed studies 
showing the carcinogenicity of kepone for about 10 years, "until workers at Life Sciences, 
an Allied spin-off corporation in Honeywell, Virginia, developed crippling neurological 
and other diseases from exposure to very high levels of kepone in grossly deficient working 
conditions." Id. at 20. "Dow and DuPont have admitted 'routine destruction' of workers' 
records after ten years employment, including those of workers exposed to occupational 
carcinogens, as a matter of policy." Id. at 21. 
Examples cited in the Senate hearings were Hoffman-LaRoche's failure to report liver 
damage from the use of its product Marsalid to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
resulting in fifty-three deaths that could have been prevented by disclosure; Richardson-
Merrell's failure to report to the FDA that some users of Thalidomide experienced peri-
pheral neuritis (such a report might have prevented the widespread experimentation with 
Thalidomide in this country); and Johnson & Johnson's failure to inform the FDA that 
Flexin was associated with fifteen deaths, resulting in six years of wide-spread sale of 
Flexin before it was withdrawn from the market. These disasters occurred, it was claimed, 
because the FDA regards toxicology data, or health and safety studies on nonantibiotic 
drugs, to be trade secrets. Hearings on S. 776, supra note 14, at 159 (statement of Dr. 
Sydney Wolfe, Health Research Group), & 178 (statement of Jacqueline M. Warren, 
Environmental Defense Fund). 
12 15 u.s.c. § 2613 (1976). 
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the results of any health and safety study which does not reveal 
"processes used in the manufacturing or processing of a chemical 
substance or mixture or, in the case of a mixture, ... the portion 
of the mixture comprised by any of the chemical substances in 
the mixture.''23 While this test does not provide the full protection 
the industry desired, protecting more information would be in-
consistent with the statutory purpose of providing public access 
to information about health and the environment. Therefore, the 
balance was struck in favor of greater disclosure.24 
In· order that the inventory may be a complete listing of all 
chemical substances manufactured or processed in the United 
States, there is to be an appendix to the inventory, made up of 
generic or family names for each of the chemical identities which 
are to be accorded trade secret status.25 In this way, the public 
knows that something of that general family of chemicals is being 
produced, but the specific identity is protected. 
B. Standards for Confidential Treatment 
The protection for trade secrets and confidential business infor-
mation is provided by section 14 of the TSCA. This section re-
quires free disclosure of all information received by the EPA ex-
cept that protected by the fourth exemption of the Freedom of 
Information Act.28 This exemption covers "trade secrets and com-
mercial and financial information obtained from a person and 
privileged or confidential."27 The FOIA exemption was chosen 
,. Id. § 2613 (b). 
24 For the standards to be applied by the EPA in determining whether a chemical 
substance will be accorded trade secret status, see note 105 and accompanying text infra. 
TSCA provides more protection for trade secrets that·are part of test data than does 
prior legislation. The Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972 (FEPCA) 
differs from the TSCA in that it does not require disclosure of health and safety studies. 
While permitting companies to designate information as confidential, however, the 
FEPCA leaves the determination of that status to the Administrator's judgment. "[T]he 
Administrator shall not make public information which in his judgment contains or relates 
to trade secrets or commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privi-
leged or confidential .... " 7 U.S.C. § 136(h)(b) (1976). Based on that mandate, the 
Administrator decided that no test results were to have confidential status. In Chevron 
Chemical Co. v. Costle, 443 F. Supp. 1024 (N.D. Cal. 1978), brought under the aforemen-
tioned statute, the court held that the Administrator could not exclude all test data from 
confidential protection. Such a policy was deemed arbitrary and in violation of the statute 
and the legislative intent. 
25 40 C.F.R. § 710.7(0(1) (1979). There is no statutory basis for the appendix. It is a 
compromise worked out by the EPA to reconcile the comprehensive publication required 
by 15 U.S.C. § 2607(b) (1976) (establishing the inventory) with the required confidential-
ity of trade secret information under 15 U.S.C. § 2613 (1976). 40 C.F.R. § 710.7(0(1) 
(1979). 
21 15 u.s.c. § 2613(8) (1976). 
27 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976). If Congress had not specifically included this exemption, 
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because there is an established body of law interpreting it, giving 
the industry and the Administrator for Toxic Substances a guide-
line for implementing section 14 of the TSCA. It also ensures a 
uniform standard of evaluation for the EPA to apply in handling 
all FOIA requests for information. 28 . 
Most of the litigation interpreting the fourth exemption has 
primarily dealt with the meaning of "confidential and financial 
information." There has been little litigation as to the definition 
of a "trade secret" because the considerations that go into making 
that determination were well-defined at common law. These com-
mon law criteria are still used, as in the recent case of Chevron 
Chemical Co. v. Castle. 29 In determining trade secret status, the 
Chevron Court cited: (1) the cost of developing the data; (2) the 
value of the data to the owner and to competitors, i.e., the extent 
of the competitive advantage; (3) the extent to which the data are 
not independently known or available to others; and (4) the ex-
tent to which the owner has maintained this confidentiality. 30 
The court in National Parks and Conservation Association v. 
Morton31 developed a test for identifying "confidential commer-
cial and financial information" that has consistently been fol-
lowed: 
[C]ommercial or financial matter is "confidential" for 
purposes of the exemption if disclosure of the information 
is likely to have either of the following effects: (1) to im-
pair the Government's ability to obtain necessary infor-
mation in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to 
the competitive position of the person from whom the in-
formation was obtained.32 
The court in National Parks stated that where information is 
required by statute to be reported, as with the TSCA, the govern-
ment's ability to obtain information cannot be impaired.33 That 
it is likely that the courts would still have found that it applied. The major significance 
of its inclusion is that Congress narrowed the exemption from the very broad coverage of 
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976) which had been included in prior proposed toxic substances 
legislation. See note 17 supra and note 155 infra. 
21 H.R. REP. No. 94-1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1976). 
21 443 F.Supp. 1024 (N.D. Cal. 1978): 
30 Id. at 1031. 
"' 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
31 Id. at 770 (emphasis added). See also Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 
1978); Continental Oil Co. v. FTC, 519 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1975); Nemetz v. Dep't of 
Treasury, 446 F. Supp. 102 (N.D. Ill. 1978) . 
.. The TSCA provides for a civil penalty of a fine up to $25,000 per day for any failure 
to comply with the rules or reporting requirements of the Administrator. In addition to or 
in lieu of the civil penalty, a person failing to comply with the act may be subject to a 
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leaves "substantial harm to competitive position" as the only test 
of the confidentiality of commercial or financial information 
under TSCA. 
C. Procedure for Designating Information as Confidential 
The EPA's regulations allow a company to claim confidential 
treatment for six specific items of information. These items are: 
"company name; [manufacturing or storage] site; the specific 
chemical identity; whether the chemical substance is manufac-
tured, imported or processed; whether the chemical substance is 
manufactured and processed only within one site and not distrib-
uted for commercial purposes outside that site; and the quantity 
manufactured, imported or processed."34 The regulations require 
that any claim of confidentiality be submitted on the same form 
as the item of information, and substantiated at that time in a 
manner specified in the form instructions. 35 If this substantiation 
does not accompany the information, the EPA will consider it a 
waiver of the confidentiality claim, and will publish the informa-
tion without further notice to the submitting company.38 
For most of the information submitted to the EPA, the confi-
dential classification and substantiation will not be evaluated 
immediately upon receipt, but the information will immediately 
receive confidential treatment.37 The need for confidentiality will 
only be considered when the EPA receives a request for the infor-
mation pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. 38 This, how-
ever, is not the procedure when specific chemical identities are 
submitted as confidential. In that case the regulations provide a 
separate procedure for proving the need for confidentiality. 
In addition to the detailed, written substantiation required for 
any claim of confidentiality, there are four39 requirements which 
criminal fine of up to $25,000 per day for each day of violation. 15 U.S.C. § 2614 (1976). 
Presumably the criminal sanctions for violation of reporting requirements will deter com-
panies from hiding information. 
" 40 C.F.R. § 710.7(a) (1979). 
•• Id. § 710.7(b). 
31 Id. § 710.7(d). 
37 Interview with Steven D. Jellinek, Assistant Administrator for Toxic Substances, 
Environmental Protection Agency, in Ann Arbor, Michigan (November 2, 1978). See also 
40 C.F.R. § 2.204(d) (1979). 
•• This process of evaluation is described in part Ill B infra. 
" 40 C.F.R. § 710.7(e)(2) (1979). Two of these are self-explanatory and will not be 
discussed in detail. These are that the submitter must 
(r]eport the specific chemical identity, [and h]ave available, and agree to fur-
nish to EPA upon request ... either an x-ray diffraction pattern (in the case of 
inorganic substances) or a mass spectrum for the particular chemical substance 
(in the case of most other substances), a sample of the substance in its purest 
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the submitting company of a chemical identity must meet in 
order to avoid waiver of its claim of confidentiality.40 One is that 
the submitting company must propose a generic name for the 
chemical for inclusion in the appendix to the inventory. This 
generic name may only be as general as necessary to protect the 
chemical's identity. 41 If the Administrator finds the proposed 
name too vague, he will ask the company to submit more specific 
names. If none of these names is satisfactory, the Administrator 
will select a generic name he believes will protect the chemical 
identity and yet be as specific as possible. 42 The Administrator 
will then give the company 30 days notice prior to placing its 
chosen name in the appendix.43 
The fourth requirement is that the submitting company must 
also agree that the EPA may disclose to a person with a "bona 
fide intent to manufacture the substance ... the fact that the 
particular chemical substance is included in the inventory for 
purposes of ... premanufacture notification."44 Thus, when a 
company wants to manufacture a new chemical substance that 
is not on the inventory, but may fall within one of the generic 
chemical names listed in the appendix, the manufacturer may 
ask the EPA whether the specific substance is already included 
in the inventory. This saves the company the time and expense 
of going through the premarket notification and screening re-
quired under section 2604 for a new chemical substance. 45 The 
procedure the EPA employs to determine whether the inquiring 
Id. 
form, an elemental analysis, any additional or alternative spectra, or other data 
that may be required to resolve uncertainties with respect to the identity of the 
substance. 
•• Id. This would result in the inclusion of the chemical identity on the inventory. 
"Id. 
"Id. § 710.7(0. See Part I supra for a discussion of the industry's hesitation to allow 
even a generic name to be published on the inventory. 
" 40 C.F.R. § 719.7(0 (1979). 
" Id. § 719.7(e)(2). 
" See note 7 supra. This savings is substantial because a reliable test for carcinogenicity 
requires at least 2-3 years, uses many animals, and costs between $200,000 and $400,000 
per chemical. Any simpler, faster methods can be expected to give the wrong result twenty 
percent of the time. Consider also that in 1956 Dow Chemical Company spent $1-3 million 
on research and development for each pesticide that became commercially successful. 
Today the cost is closer to $13.5 million. Dow requires 8-9 years to develop a new pesti-
cide. It is not surprising that between 1956 and 1965 an average of thirty-nine new drugs 
per year were introduced commercially, but between 1966 and 1977 the average fell to only 
fifteen per year. Blair, Toxic Substances Legislation: Regulators v. Science, ENVIR. POL. 
& LAw 138, 139 (1976). Most chemicals do not have the potential for harm that drugs and 
pesticides present and so may require less extensive testing. These figures do show, how-
ever, the recent significant increase in research costs and make it clear that escaping pre-
market screening involves a substantial saving of time and money. 
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company has a bona fide intent· to manufacture and whether the 
specific substance is identical to the substance represented on the 
appendix to the inventory by the generic name are discussed in 
part III A .. 
II. DISCLOSURES OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AUTHORIZED BY 
THE TSCA WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
A. Disclosure Pursuant to Requests by Federal Officers or 
Federal Agencies Besides the EPA 
Section 14(a)(l) of the TSCA provides for disclosure of -infor-
mation classified as confidential to "any officer or employee of 
the United States (A) in connection with (his) official duties . . . 
under any law for the protection of health or the environment, or 
(B) for specific law enforcement purposes."48 While the Act pro-
vides no notice to the submitting company prior to such disclo-
sure, the EPA regulations provide for notice to the company ten 
days prior to disclosure to another federal agency. 47 The EPA has 
made clear, however, that it considers this notice to be discretion-
ary, with no statutory or constitutional requirement. 48 
In one of the first actions to arise under the TSCA, Polaroid 
Corporation brought suit against the EPA seeking an injunction 
to delay the submission to the EPA of what it claimed was confi-
dential information on twenty highly critical chemicals. 49 In that 
action, filed prior to the promulgation of the regulations requiring 
notice by the EPA, Polaroid claimed its due process rights would 
be violated if it were required to submit confidential information 
before final protective regulations were promulgated, and before 
" 15 U.S.C. § 2613(a)(l) (1976). 
" [S]uch notice may be given by notice published in the FEDERAL REGIS-
TER at least 10 days prior to disclosure, or by letter sent by certified mail return 
receipt requested or telegram either of which must be received by the affected 
business at least 10 days prior to disclosure. 
40 C.F.R. § 2.209(c)(3) (1979). 
18 43 Fed. Reg. 39,997, 39,998-99 (1978). In a letter dated Sept. 1, 1978, accompanying 
the changes to 40 C.F.R., Administrator Castle stated, 
Id. 
Notwithstanding EPA's position that notice is not legally required [prior to dis-
closure to Federal agencies], EPA has decided as a matter of policy to give notice 
in the case of disclosures to other Federal agencies and Congress, and pursuant 
to Federal court orders. . . . The additional notice requirements in these regula-
tions will result in additional administrative burdens on EPA's programs. If these 
burdens begin to hamper the effective implementation of EPA's statutory man-
dates, the Agency may have to reconsider these notice requirements and further 
amend these regulations after rulemaking and public comment. 
" Polaroid Corporation v. Costle, No. 78-1133-S (D. Mass., filed May 23, 1978). 
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it had an opportunity to challenge those regulations.50 
The trial court issued a temporary injunction ordering Polaroid 
to submit the information, but prohibiting the EPA from releas-
ing it to other federal agencies, contractors, or anyone else.51 The 
district court found that Polaroid had a reasonable likelihood of 
establishing that the lack of standards for such release, for notice, 
and for hearing and judicial review might make disclosure of 
confidential information under the TSCA a deprivation of prop-
erty without due process of law. Both the EPA and Polaroid were 
directed to submit briefs on the constitutionality of the disclosure 
provisions.52 In the meantime, however, the EPA promulgated the 
provisions requiring notice, and Polaroid's subsequent with-
drawal of its claim deprived the court of the opportunity to decide 
whether notice is constitutionally required.53 
In another recent case, Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 54 the District 
Court for the District of Columbia held that there is no constitu-
tional requirement of notice to the company prior to disclosure of 
information by an agency to Congress.55 While that court was 
principally concerned with judicial interference with the legisla-
tive process, it gave another reason for not finding notice to be 
constitutionally mandated which may also be found to be applic-
able to disclosure to other federal agencies. Relying on an earlier 
opinion in which disclosure to Congress was held not to be "public 
00 8 ENVIR. L. REP. (ELI) 65,572 (1978). Polaroid claimed that trade secrets are property 
interests protected by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. It sought only 
interim relief, pending the promulgation of specific TSCA security regulations. Id. 
Polaroid was particularly concerned with the lack of provision in the existing regulations 
for notice prior to disclosure to federal agencies, Congress, and EPA contractors, contend-
ing that without a notice requirement, those regulations were inadequate to protect confi-
dential information. Notice to the submitting company prior to disclosure is necessary to 
enable the company either to request a hearing as to the confidentiality designation, or 
to file suit to enjoin disclosure, both significant protections. See parts II B and ill C infra. 
The EPA's position was that since 15 U.S.C. § 2613 did not require the promulgation 
of regulations, the absence of those regulations did not justify Polaroid's exclusion from 
the reporting requirements. The EPA argued that existing regulations and ·the criminal 
penalties in the TSCA provide adequate protection for confidential information. 8 ENVIR. 
L. REP. (ELI) 65,572 (1978). This argument, however, was not directly responsive to 
Polaroid's claim of a violation of due process through the lack of a notice provision. First, 
the severity of the criminal penalties is an inadequate measure of the protection afforded 
trade secrets. See note 180 infra. In addition, Polaroid was concerned with legal disclosures 
to other federal agencies, EPA contractors, and Congress, not with the criminal penalties 
for illegal disclosure; it was uncontested that the criminal penalties were sufficiently 
rigorous. 
" 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 361 (1978). 
" Id. 
53 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1302 (1978). Spokesmen for Polaroid said that the firm was 
satisfied with the final confidentiality regulations issued by the EPA and with the final 
internal security procedures adopted by the EPA for the physical handling of confidential 
data. Id. 
"' 589 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
,. For a discussion of disclosures to Congress under the TSCA, see part ill C infra. 
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disclosure, " 56 the court said, "[b ]ecause such divulgement is not 
'public', it does not in itself impair the value of the trade secrets 
involved, and thus does not involve a deprivation prior to which 
a hearing is required."57 
The EPA could argue that disclosure to other federal agencies 
is also not "public disclosure" and for that reason notice is not 
constitutionally required. 58 This analogy of agency access to con-
gressional subpoena power, however, is unpersuasive. Congress 
historically has enjoyed a privileged position in its information-
gathering efforts. The courts are so reluctant to interfere with 
Congress that a presumption of good faith has been placed on 
congressional treatment of confidential information. In the ab-
sence of an express intent to disclose, the courts will presume that 
Congress will not release the information. 59 There is no necessity 
for such a presumption in favor of access by federal agencies. 
Agencies are the creations of Congress and are not entitled to the 
judicial deference granted Congress itself under the separation of 
powers doctrine. 
The EPA should retain the notice provision for practical rea-
sons. The success of the TSCA depends on the cooperation of the 
industry. The greater the respect the EPA shows for industry 
concerns, the higher the degree of cooperation that can be ex-
pected from the industry. 
B. Disclosure to EPA Contractors 
In order to avoid having to expand greatly its research staff and 
facilities in order to implement the TSCA, the EPA plans to use 
•• Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 548 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
57 Exxon, 589 F.2d at 589. Thus, it might be argued that absent a showing that informa-
tion given to a federal officer or agency will definitely be made public, such disclosure is 
also not public and so does not require notice. 
The Exxon court stated that information submitted to the FTC under an agreement 
that notice would be given prior to a disclosure to Congress could not later be disclosed 
without such notice. Id. at 589. It is unclear whether information submitted while the 
current regulations which require notice are in effect could not be disclosed without notice 
should the notice requirement later be removed from the regulations. The Exxon court 
refused to impose a·mandatory ten-day notice requirement on the FTC, but did say that 
"normally reasonable advance notice can be required, [however) in exigent circumstan-
ces Congress has full authority to issue forthwith subpoenas and formally request immedi-
ate disclosure." Id. at 588 . 
.. The Ashland court gave little guidance in determining what would constitute "public 
disclosure." It said simply that in that case there was no showing that the confidential 
materials would be "made public" if disclosed to Congress, and that absent such a show-
ing, Congress would not be precluded from obtaining the trade secrets pursuant either to 
subpoena or formal request. 548 F.2d at 979. 
•• Ashland Oil v. FTC, 548 F.2d 977, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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contractors to do much of the testing the Act requires. 80 Section 
14(a)(2) provides for disclosure of confidential information to 
EPA contractors "if in the opinion of the Administrator such 
disclosure is necessary for the satisfactory performance by the 
contractor of a contract with the United States . . . in connection 
with this chapter."81 The TSCA provides no notice to the submit-
ting company prior to disclosure to the contractor, but notice is 
required by the regulations.82 This notice is to "include a descrip-
tion of the information to be disclosed, the identity of the contrac-
tor or subcontractor, the contract or subcontract number, if any, 
and the purposes to be served by such disclosure."83 The submit-
ting company must be given at least five working days in which 
to respond with comments. 84 
C. Disclosure During TSCA Proceedings 
The TSCA provides that confidential business information 
"may be disclosed when relevant in any ·proceeding under this 
chapter, except that disclosure in such a proceeding shall be 
made in such manner as to preserve confidentiality to the extent 
practicable without impairing the proceeding."85 This disclosure 
may be made without notice to the submitting company. 
There are three types of proceedings under the TSCA to which 
this provision applies. First are the meetings held by the Intra-
agency Testing Committee established by the TSCA to evaluate 
new chemical substances.88 This committee makes recommenda-
'° These contractors may be college students and professors, or large chemical research 
companies, depending on the EPA's needs. Interview with Steven D. Jellinek, supra note 
37. See Hearings on H.R. 7229, H.R. 7548, and H.R. 7664, supra note 9, at 94 (proposed 
amendments to H.R. 7664 by Mr. McCollister): 
It is important, however, that all information obtained pursuant to the Act be 
made available to contractors of the U.S. if such disclosure is necessary for the 
satisfactory performance of the contract. Since much of the Agency's workload 
undoubtedly will be contractual this provision is vital to the legislation's success-
ful implementation. 
11 15 U.S.C. § 2613(a)(2) (1976). 
12 40 C.F.R. § 2.301(h)(2) (1979), as applied to TSCA by 40 C.F.R. § 2.201(e) (1979). 
13 Id. This notice, like that prior to disclosure to federal officers, is considered by the 
EPA to be merely a matter of policy and is changeable at any time. See notes 48-53 and 
accompanying text supra. The considerations that led the Exxon court to hold that notice 
prior to disclosure to Congress is not constitutionally required are not as clearly present 
in the case of disclosure to contractors. Disclosure to contractors can be more easily 
perceived as public and thus notice might be found to be required. 
u Id. § 2.301 (h)(2)(iii). 
11 15 U.S.C. § 2613(a)(4) (1976). 
u Id. § 2603(e)(l)(A). The committee is to consist of eight members from federal agen-
cies and departments as follows: 
(i) One member appointed by the Administrator from the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency. 
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tions to the Administrator as to which chemicals require more 
research and testing before they can be accurately evaluated.87 
Another form of proceeding under the TSCA is a court hearing 
initiated by the Administrator. A proceeding of this type can be 
initiated to serve two purposes. If the Administrator determines 
that there are insufficient data about a chemical with which to 
make a reasoned evaluation as to its health and environmental 
effects, or if the chemical is likely to enter the environment in 
substantial quantities, he may seek an injunction to prohibit or 
limit its manufacture until sufficientinformation becomes avail-
able. 88 The Administrator may also seek an injunction if, in the 
absence of sufficient information, the manufacture, processing, or 
distribution "may present an unreasonable risk of injury to 
health or the environment . . . . " 89 The Administrator may also 
start a civil action in the appropriate district court for seizure of 
"an imminently hazardous chemical substance"70 or for other re-
lief. 71 
(ii) One member appointed by the Secretary of Labor .... 
(iii) One member appointed by the Chairman of the Council on Environmental 
Quality .... 
(iv) One member appointed by the Director of the National Institute for Occu-
pational Safety and Health . . . . 
(v) One member appointed by the Director of the National Institute of Environ-
mental Health Sciences . . . . 
(vi) One member appointed by the Director of the National Cancer Institute 
(vii) One member appointed by the Director of the National Science Foundation 
(viii) One member appointed by the Secretary of Commerce .... 
Id. § 2603(e)(2)(A). Each member appointed is to be an officer or employee of the same 
department as the person who selects that member. Id. § 2603(e)(l)(B)(i). 
17 Id. § 2603(e)(l)(A). Factors the committee is to consider in making its determinations 
are: (1) the quantities in which the substance is or will be manufactured; (2) the quantities 
in which it will reach the environment; (3) the number of individuals who are or will be 
exposed to it in their places of employment, and the duration of the exposure; (4) the 
extent to which human beings in any capacity are or will be exposed to the substance; 
(5) the extent to which the substance is closely related to a substance known to present 
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment; (6) existing data concerning 
the substance's effects on health and the environment; (7) the reasonably foreseeable 
availability of facilities and personnel for performing testing on the substance. Id. 
In establishing its list of the chemicals about which the data are most uncertain, the 
committee is to give priority to those chemical substances "which are suspected of causing 
or contributing to cancer, gene mutation or birth defects." Id. 
•• Id. 
•• Id. § 2604(e)(2)(B)(ii)(I). 
70 15 U.S.C. § 2606(a)(l) (1976). 
71 The TSCA provides that 
[T]he relief authorized . . . may include the issuance of a mandatory order 
requiring (A) in the case of purchasers of such substance, mixture, or article 
known to the defendant, notification to such purchasers of the risk associated with 
it; (B) public notice of such risk; (C) recall; (D) the replacement or repurchase of 
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The third type of TSCA proceedings is informal hearings con-
ducted by the Administrator.72 These hearings can arise in two 
contexts: (1) in evaluating the risks presented by the manufac-
ture of a chemical substance and determining what regulations 
to issue;73 and (2) in determining whether to require a company 
to institute more rigorous quality control measures.7' The EPA 
regulations provide that prior to any public disclosure of informa-
such substance, mixture or article; or (E) any combination of the actions de-
scribed in the preceding clauses. 
Id. § 2606(b)(2). 
72 These hearings are considered informal because "[t]he Administrator may prescribe 
such rules and make such rulings concerning procedures in such hearings to avoid unnec-
essary costs or delay." Id. § 2605(c)(3)(B). This is not, however, an indication that the 
EPA considers them unimportant. 
15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(3)(D) (1976) provides for a verbatim transcript to be taken of any 
oral presentation made in any informal hearing under subsection (c), and "[s]uch tran-
script shall be available to the public." It seems, however, that this subsection cannot be 
read literally because the TSCA provides that "disclosure in such a proceeding shall be 
made in such manner as to preserve confidentiality to the extent practicable without 
impairing the proceeding." Id. § 2613(a)(4). In addition, 40 C.F.R. §2.205(c) (1979) pro-
tects information submitted to the EPA as part of a company's comn:ients in support of 
its confidentiality claim. Therefore, it would be anamolous to require a transcript includ-
ing confidential information to be made public when the Administrator may refuse to 
release the original confidential information. 
73 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1976). The TSCA provides that the Administrator must conduct 
an informal hearing when making these determinations, and must give the affected busi-
ness the opportunity to present its position orally or by documentary evidence, or both. 
Id. § 2605(c)(3)(A). 
" Id. § 2605(b)(2). Hearings under this provision are to be held in accordance with 5 
U.S.C. §554, which provides in part: "The agency shall give all interested parties oppor-
tunity for (1) the submission and consideration of facts, arguments, offers of settlement, 
or proposals of adjustment when time, the nature of the proceeding, and the public's 
interest permit . ... "5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1976) (emphasis added). 
This provision does not guarantee an opportunity for a hearing as does 15 U.S.C. § 
2605(c)(3)(A) (1976). See note 73 supra. The difference is probably due to the relative 
immediacy of the subject matter of the hearings being conducted. The determinations to 
be made under 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) are prospective. Since manufacture has not yet comm-
enced, there is time to guarantee a hearing before any possible damage could be done to 
health or the environment. On the other hand, proceedings under §2605(b)(2) to evaluate 
quality control procedures may be conducted after manufacture and distribution have 
commenced. In this situation, there may be a much greater need for immediate action. 
Thus, the Administrator may limit the submission of facts and argument when the public 
interest requires. 
The Administrator may also decide that the use of inadequate quality control proce-
dures has resulted in the distribution of a substance which presents an unreasonable risk 
to health or the environment. In this case the Administrator may require the manufacturer 
to 
(i) give notice of such risk to processors or distributors . . . and . . . any other 
person in possession of . . . such substance, 
(ii) to give public notice of such risk, and 
(iii) to provide such replaceinent or repurchase of any such substance or mixture 
as is necessary to adequately protect health or the environment. 
15 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(2)(B) (1976). 
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tion in connection with these hearings, the presiding officer shall 
notify the business affected by the proposed disclosure, and allow 
opportunity for response. 75 Information may only be disclosed if 
"the EPA office conducting the proceeding determines that the 
public interest would be served by making the information avail-
able to the public."78 When the decision to release is made on the 
record, after an opportunity for a hearing, the regulations provide 
that disclosure to any of the parties of record, where there are 
protective arrangements, will not affect the confidential treat-
ment the information receives for all other purposes of the Act.77 
D. Disclosure When Necessary to Protect Health or the 
Environment 
The TSCA permits the Administrator to release confidential 
information when he "determines [that] it [is] necessary to 
protect health or the environment against an unreasonable risk 
of injury .... "78 Presumably this disclosure is to a state health 
protection or police agency. The notice to the submitting com-
pany provided by the Act for this type of disclosure varies with 
the immediacy of the threat of harm. Where the threat of harm 
is not immediate, the Administrator must give at least fifteen 
days written notice prior to the release of the information.79 In the 
event of an imminent, unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment, the Administrator may use such means as he deter-
mines will provide at least twenty four hours notice before the 
disclosure is made.80 
ill. DISCLOSURES OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION TO PARTIES OUT-
SIDE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
There are three ways by which parties outside of the executive 
branch of the government and its contractors may obtain confi-
dential information not included on the inventory. One is through 
a request by a bona fide manufacturer of a chemical substance 
identical to one included in the appendix to the inventory.81 An-
1• 40 C.F.R. §§ 2.204(d)(l), .301(g)(2) (1979). Such notice is to be "furnished by certified 
mail (return receipt requested), by personal delivery, or by other means which allows 
verification of the fact and date of the receipt." Id. § 2.204(e)(l). 
" Id. § 2.301(g)(2). 
77 Id. An example of such an arrangement might be one requring health enforcement 
officials to protect the secrecy of information to which they are granted access. 
78 15 U.S.C. § 2613(a)(3) (1976). 
71 Id. § 2613(c)(2)(8)(i). 
80 Id. 
81 40 C.F.R. § 710.7(g) (1979). 
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other is through a request pursuant to the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act. 82 The third is via a request from a committee of Con-
gress.83 
A. Disclosures to Bona Fide Manufacturers 
A chemical identity which is submitted to the EPA as confiden-
tial will be included in the appendix to the inventory under a 
generic name to preserve its anonymity.84 When submitting such 
an identity, a company must agree to the release to a requesting 
bona fide manufacturer of the same chemical substance of the 
fact that the chemical is included in the appendix. 85 A company 
which proposes to manufacture a new chemical would be vitally 
interested in determining whether its proposed substance was 
already on the inventory. If the chemical substance is already on 
the inventory, the EPA does not require the extensive pre-
manufacture screening all new chemical substances must un-
dergo under the TSCA.88 This will result in a considerable savings 
in time, money, and resources. 87 
Since this information may only be disclosed to a bona fide 
manufacturer of the same substance, when he receives a request 
from a manufacturer for permission to produce and market a 
chemical substance which that manufacturer thinks may be in-
cluded in one of the generic categories in the appendix, the Ad-
ministrator must make two factual determinations. One is 
whether the requester has a bona fide intent to market this chem-
ical substance, that is, that he is not merely on a "fishing trip" 
for information.88 The second is whether the prpposed substance 
is virtually identical to the one in the appendix. 89 
To make these determinations, the Administrator requires sub-
mission of a signed statement of intent to manufacture, 90 a de-
scription of research to date, 91 and specific chemical information 
that will allow a determination as to whether the new substance 
12 5 u.s.c. § 552 (1976). 
83 15 U.S.C. § 2613(e) (1976). 
84 See part I C supra. 
83 40 C.F.R. § 710.7(e)(2)(iv) (1979). 
"' 15 U.S.C. § 2603(c) (1976). 
87 See notes 2, 7, & 45 supra. 
"' 40 C.F.R. § 710.7(g)(2) (1979). 
•• Id. § 710.7(g)(l). 
'° Id. § 710.7(g)(2). The intent to manufacture must be for a "commercial purpose" in 
order to stop companies from seeking information about competitors' products with no 
intent to manufacture them for profit. Id. § 710.7(g)(l). 
" Id. § 710.7(g)(2). 
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is the same as the one listed. 82 
If the EPA were to request 'additional information after it had 
begun a comparative analysis of the requesting company's chemi-
cal, the mere request for more information might tell the com-
pany that something very similar was already included in the 
appendix. To prevent this from happening, the EPA requires that 
all the necessary comparative information be submitted with the 
original request.83 Thus if either the company is found not to have 
a bona fide intent to manufacture, or the substances are not 
sufficiently alike, the requesting company will receive no infor-
mation· as to the chemical which is listed under the generic name. 
Once the verification information is received from the request-
ing company, the EPA may notify the original submitting com-
pany of the request and require them to provide additional infor-
mation for comparison with the newly proposed substance.84 If the 
" The specific information required is: 
an elemental analysis, ... Either an x-ray diffraction pattern _(in the case of 
inorganic substances) or a mass spectrum (in the case of most other substances) 
of the particular chemical substance, . . . a sample of the substance in its purest 
form, •if requested, and . . . any additional or alternative spectra, or other data 
that may be required to resolve uncertainties with respect to the identity of the 
chemical substance. 
Id. This is the same information that a submitting company is required to have available 
for comparison by the EPA under § 710.7(e)(2). See notes 39-44 supra. 
The EPA also needs a list of the purposes for which the chemical substance is to be 
manufactured, because under § 5 of the TSCA, the Administrator may require additional 
testing of a substance already included on the inventory if it is to be manufactured for a 
"significant new use." 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(l)(B) (1976). In determining whether it is a 
"significant new use, 1' the Administrator shall consider 
(A) the projected volume of manufacturing and processing of a chemical sub-
stance, (B) the extent to which a use changes the type or form of exposure of 
human beings or the environment to a chemical substance, (C) tl;le extent to 
which a use increases the magnitude and duration of exposure of human beings 
or the environment to a chemical substance, and (D) the reasonably anticipated 
manner and methods of manufacturing, processing, distribution in commerce, 
and disposal of a chemical substance. 
Id. § 2604(a)(2). 
13 40 C.F.R. § 710.7(g)(2) (1979). There was much concern expressed with the originally-
proposed regulations, which did not sufficiently protect the. fact that the submitting 
company manufactured a particular substance. It was pointed out that simply by asking 
for specific verification information from the requesting company, the EPA let the re-
questing company know what types of comparisons it was making. The uniform reporting 
requirements seem to be more effective in protecting submitting company secrets. 
" Id. § 710.7(g)(3). It should be noted that this notice is only provided when the EPA 
is in need of more information with which to compare the newly-proposed chemical. Thus, 
the notice to the submitting company is incidental to the request for more information. If 
the EPA has already received this information pursuant to a prior comparative analysis, 
it will not notify the submitting company of the new request. Additionally, the quantity 
of information which the EPA requires with the original submission of the chemical 
substance is designed to eliminate the need for later additional requests. Thus, in most 
situations, the EPA will not ask for more information, and the original company will have 
no notice of the comparison being made. 
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submitting company does not provide this information, its claim 
of confidentiality will be considered waived by the EPA and the 
EPA will place the chemical identity on the inventory without 
further notice to the submitter.95 
If, after comparative analyses have been made, the Adminis-
trator decides the identities are not sufficiently similar to pre-
sume they are the same, he informs the requesting company that 
the specific identity is not on the inventory and that the company 
must go ahead with premarket screening.98 If the Administrator 
decides the two identities may be presumed to be the same, he 
will notify the requesting company that the chemical identity is 
on the inventory and ·that premarket screening is not required.97 
This notification to the requesting company of the chemical 
identity's presence on the inventory is not considered a disclosure 
by the EPA and thus no notice is to be given to the original 
submitting company.98 The submitter is put in a "Catch-22" situ-
ation. He is forced to agree to the release of the fact of inclusion 
on the inventory at the time he submits his information or else 
he waives his whole confidentiality claim.99 At the same time, 
once he has signed the release agreement, he waives all right to 
notice of the release to a bona fide manufacturer. 100 In either 
event, the fact that his trade secret chemical identity exists be-
comes known by at least one competitor and the market balance 
on the substance may be expected to change. 
It is incongruous that the EPA is required to provide notice to 
submitting companies in virtually all situations prior to disclo-
sure except this one, which has great potential for severe eco-
nomic damage. The fact of disclosure of an identical match of 
chemical identities is purely business information and so outside 
the primary focus of the TSCA. A better policy which is more in 
keeping with the cooperative spirit to be fostered between indus-
try and the EPA would at a minimum provide notice of the re-
lease to the submitting company. This would prevent the request-
ing company from having the advantage of knowing that he has 
a competitor while the original submitter knows nothing of the 
new manufacturer. 
•• Id. § 710.7(g)(3)(ii). It is highly unlikely that the submitting company will ignore such 
a request. It is the party with the chief interest in proving differences in the two chemicals. 
" Id. § 710.7(g)(6). 
17 Id. § 710.7(g)(5). 
•• Id. § 710.7(g)(7). The revelation of the chemical's existence is not seen as a public 
disclosure by the EPA because the submitting company had signed an agreement permit-
ting such disclosure when it submitted the chemical. Id. § 710.7(e)(2). See notes 85-87 and 
accompanying text supra. 
" 40 C.F.R. § 710.7(e)(2) (1979). See note 98 supra. 
100 Id. § 710.7(g)(7). 
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B. Disclosure Pursuant to a Request for Information Under the 
Freedom of Information Act 
When a company submits information designated as confiden-
tial to the EPA, no immediate evaluation is made of that designa-
tion.101 The material is treated as confidential from the time it is 
received. The confidential designation is usually reviewed upon 
receipt of a request for the information pursuant to the Freedom 
of Information Act. 102 
After receiving such a request, the EPA notifies the submitting 
company of the request and allows the company time to present 
comments in support of its confidentiality claim.'03 The request-
ing company is told that the information requested may be confi-
dential, and that further inquiry is necessary before the EPA is 
able to comply with the request. The request is thus initially 
denied, pending a final determination by the EPA legal office.'04 
EPA regulations provide a five-fold test for determining 
whether information deserves confidential treatment. 165 Should 
1•
1 Interview with Steven D. Jellinek, supra note 37. 40 C.F.R. § 2.204(a)(2) (1979), 
however. permits evaluation of a claim of confidentiality whenever the EPA desires, even 
though no request for release of the information has been received. This would include 
the evaluation of specific chemical identities immediately upon receipt by the EPA. See 
part I C supra. 
40 C.F.R. § 2.204(a)(3) (1979) permits the EPA to evaluate a claim of confidentiality 
when it determines that it is likely the EPA will be asked to disclose the information in 
the future. The reason given for this is to "increase the time available for preparation and 
submission of comments ... and to make easier the task of meeting response deadlines 
of a request for release of the information is later received under 5 U.S.C. § 552." 40 C.F.R. 
§ 2.204(a)(3) (1979). 
102 Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified in 5 
U.S.C. § 552 (1976)). The EPA determines the validity of a claim of confidentiality when 
an EPA office "learns that it is responsible for responding to a request under 5 U.S.C. § 
552 for the release of information." 40 C.F.R. § 2.204(a)(l) (1979). 
The Freedom of Information Act procedure for requesting is frequently used because it 
is an easy and inexpensive way for companies to discover information about their competi-
tors which the government has in its files. An estimated ninety percent of the FOIA 
requests received by the EPA are from the competitors of the submitting companies, 
according to Steven D. Jellinek, Assistant Administrator for Toxic Substances, EPA (ad-
dress sponsored by the University of Michigan Dep't of Pub. Health (Nov. 2, 1978)). 
103 40 C.F.R. § 2.204(d) (1979). The "comments" solicited in this procedure are in 
addition to the verification of the confidentiality claim required to accompany the original 
submission of the data. The comments provide an opportunity for the submitting com-
pany to reinforce its confidentiality claim, and to bring its supporting information up to 
date. It is, of course, in the company's interest to provide this supporting information, but 
even if it did not, the EPA would probably have sufficient data with which to evaluate 
the confidentiality claim. 
1°' Id. 
103 [l]nformation is entitled to confidential treatment ... if-
(a) The business has asserted a business confidentiality claim which has not 
expired by its terms, nor been waived nor withdrawn; 
(b) The business has satisfactorily shown that it has taken reasonable mes-
WINTER 1980) Trade Secret Protection 349 
the EPA legal office determine that the ieformation is entitled to 
confidential treatment, it issues a final denial to the company 
requesting that information. 108 If that company then sues the 
EPA, the submitting company will be notified of the suit within 
ten days of the complaint.'07 The EPA permits free intervention 
by the submitting company.'08 Indeed, it is in the company's 
interest to cooperate with the EPA.'09 If, however, the EPA legal 
office decides that the information is not entitled to confidential 
treatment, notice of that decision is furnished to the submitting 
company. 110 The regulations make it clear that the purpose of this 
sures to protect the confidentiality of the information, and that it intends to 
continue to take such measures; 
(c) The information is not, and has not been, reasonably obtainable without 
the business' consent by other persons (other than governmental bodies) by use 
of legitimate means; ... 
(d) No statute specifically requires disclosure of the information; and 
(e) Either-
(1) The business has satisfactorily shown that disclosure of the infor-
mation is likely to cause substantial harm to the business' competitive 
position;_ or 
(2) The information is voluntarily submitted ... and its disclosure 
would be likely to impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary 
information in the future. 
Id. § 2.208 (1979). 
An example of a statute which requires disclosure per subsection (d) is 15 U.S.C. § 
2613(b) (1976), which does not permit the withholding of any health or safety study under 
a confidential business designation. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra. 
Subsection (e) incorporates the test established in National Parks & Conservation Ass'n 
v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974), for protection of commercial or confidential 
information. See notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra. "Voluntarily submitted" in-
formation is defined in the regulations as information "(1) [t)he submission of which 
EPA had no statutory or contractual authority to require; and (2) [t)he submission of 
which was not prescribed by statute or regulation as a condition of obtaining some benefit 
... under a regulatory program of general applicability .... " 40 C.F.R. § 2.20l(i) 
(1979). 
"" 40 C.F.R. § 2.205(e) (1979). 
107 Id. § 2.214(b)(l). 
108 Id. § 2.214(b)(3). It is interesting to note that the regulations discuss this interven-
tion as a duty of the submitting company rather than a privilege. "EPA will defend its 
final confidentiality determination, but EPA expects the affected business to cooperate 
to the fullest extent possible in this defense." Id. § 2.214(c). This section must be intended 
to deter frivolous claims of confidentiality: if a company knows it will have to back up its 
claim in court, perhaps it will think more carefully about the information it tries to keep 
secret. Moreover, it would make little sense for a company to provide all the information 
required by the EPA to verify its confidentiality claim, and then tum its back on a suit 
by an FOIA requester. Perhaps the EPA is simply making cooperation a condition of its 
assistance. · 
, .. The submitting company is the party with the true interest in maintaining the 
confidentiality of trade secrets. Since this information is required to be submitted by the 
TSCA, the EPA has no grounds to believe disclosure will make it more difficult to obtain 
compliance with reporting rules in the future. 
110 There is a conflict between the TSCA itself and the regulations as to how much time 
must be given in the notice period. TSCA states, "[i]f the release of such data is to be 
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notice is to give the affected company time to seek judicial review 
of the agency's determination. 111 
The FOIA does not confer jurisdiction upon courts to review an 
agency's decision to release information; 112 instead, such "reverse-
FOIA" suits have been based on general federal question jurisdic-
tion. 113 These suits have generally been premised on one of two 
theories: 114 an implied right of action based upon specific non-
made pursuant to a request made under section 552(a) of Title 5, ... [t]he Administra-
tor may not release such data until the expiration of 30 days after the manufacturer . . . 
has received the notice .... " 15 U.S.C. § 2613(c)(2)(A) (1976). In contrast to this, 40 
C.F.R. § 2.205(0(2) (1979) states, "[w]ith respect to EPA's implementation of the deter-
mination [to deny a busineBB confidentiality claim], the notice shall state that ... EPA 
will make the information available to the public on the tenth working day after the date 
of the business's receipt of the written notice . . . . " There are two ways for the affected 
business to extend the ten day notice period. One is to commence an action in a federal 
court for "judicial review of the determination, and to obtain preliminary injunctive relief 
against disclosure." 40 C.F.R. § 2.205(0(2) (1979). The other is to request an extension of 
the deadline. Id. § 2.205(0(3). This extension, however, will only be granted with the 
consent of the party making the FOIA request for the information. Id. 
In any action dealing with the question of notice, the provisions of the TSCA would 
govern, and the longer notice period would be required. 
111 40 C.F.R. § 2.205(0(2) (1979). The notice required under this section must state that 
the EPA will make the information available on the tenth working day after the receipt 
of the notice, unless it has been notified that the affected business has filed suit in a 
federal court to obtain a judicial review of the confidentiality determination. Even if such 
an action has been commenced, the EPA may still make the information available once 
the court has denied a motion for a preliminary injunction, or if it appears that the 
company is not taking measures to obtain a speedy resolution of the issue. Id. 
111 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). The FOIA confers jurisdiction to review 
de novo only an agency decision to withhold information exempt under the Act. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(4)(B) (1976). This is in keeping with the overall purpose of the FOIA to provide 
public acceBB to governmental decision-making information. 
m 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976). 
"' A third theory is that the FOIA exemptions from mandatory disclosure create an 
implied right to enjoin disclosure. Note, Administrative Disclosure of Private Business 
Records Under the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis of Alternative Methods of 
Review, 28 SYRACUSE L. REv. 923, 926 (1977). This implied cause of action has two basic 
problems. One is that it conflicts with the primary policy of FOIA, that of full disclosure 
and easy access to information. The other is that it is premised on the assumption that 
the exemptions listed in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) are mandatory rather than discretionary. The 
legislative history and judicial interpretations of FOIA suggest that in drafting FOIA, 
Congress recognized the confidential business concerns involved, but it chose not to pro-
vide an absolute protection for them. 
[T]he congressional concern was with the agency's need or preference for confi-
dentiality; the FOIA by itself protects the submitters' interest in confidentiality 
only to the extent that this interest is endorsed by the agency collecting the 
information . . . . Congress did not design the FOIA exemptions to be mandatory 
bars to disclosure. 
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292-93 (1979). "Both the plain language of§ 552(b) 
and the CongreBBional reports and debates suggest that no more was intended than a 
discretionary exception to the general mandatory duty of disclosure." Chrysler Corp. v. 
Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1185 (3d Cir. 1977). 
If the exemptions are determined to be discretionary, as a majority of courts and com-
mentators have found, this implied cause of action theory must fail. Clement, The Rights 
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disclosure statutes, 115 and a right to review disclosure decisions 
based upon section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 118 
When an action is brought under a specific non-disclosure stat-
ute which furnishes a standard of judicial review, that standard 
is applied. 117 Actions brought under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA) are governed by section 706, the "scope of review" 
provision. 118 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals designed the 
of Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of Confidential Business Information: The 
Reverse Freedom of Information Act Lawsuit, 55 TEx. L. R.Ev. 587 (1977). See also Penn-
zoil Co. v. FTC, 534 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1976); Nqte, Protection From Government Disclo-
sure-The Reverse-FOIA Suit, 1976 DUKE L.J. 330. But see Westinghouse Electric Corp. 
v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977). 
·,,. The Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), is the statute upon which most 
"reverse-FOIA" plaintiffs have placed principle reliance. The Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), however, has made it clear that 
there is no private right of action to enjoin disclosure in violation of this statute. 
11• 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(l)-(2) (1976). This may be the only theory remaining to plaintiffs 
seeking to enjo_in disclosure of confidential information after Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 
U.S. 281 (1979). in that case, after rejecting Chrysler's contention that the Trade Secrets 
Act afforded a private right of action, the Court said, "a private right of action under § 
1905 is not 'necessary to make effective the congressional purpose,' J.I. Case Co. v. Borah, 
377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964), for we find that review of the decision to disclose Chrysler's 
employment data is available under the APA." Id. at 317. 
For a discussion of actions brought under this section, see Clements, supra note 114, at 
626; Note, Reverse-Freedom of Information Act Suits: Confidential Information in Search 
of Protection, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 995, 1006 (1976); Note, Protection From Government 
Disclosure-The Reverse-FOIA Suit, supra note 114, at 348. 
117 Clement, supra note 114, at 628. 
111 This provision reads: 
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action. The review court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably de-
layed; and 
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, finding, and conclu-
sions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretfon, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or im-
munity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limita-
tions, or short of statutory right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; 
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to 
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the 
record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or 
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are 
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. 
In making the foregoing determination, the court shali review the whole record 
or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial error. 
5 u.s.c. § 706 (1976). 
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following analysis for reviewing reverse-FOIA cases brought 
under the APA. The court must determine whether any specific 
non-disclosure statute is applicable. If so, then the agency deci-
sion to release is outside the scope of its authority and the disclo-
sure should be enjoined. If there is no non-disclosure statute ap-
plicable, the court must determine by what authority the agency 
intends to release the information. If the agency says the informa-
tion is not within an FOIA exemption, the court must determine 
whether the agency applied the proper legal standard for applica-
bility of the FOIA exemptions. Where information is within an 
exemption, but the agency says that disclosure is desirable and 
permissible, the court has to make a two step analysis. It must 
determine whether the agency applied the proper legal standard 
for application of FOIA exemptions, and if so, the court must 
determine whether the agency considered the proper factors in 
determining that disclosure was permitted under its own disclo-
sure regulations. If an agency record is too incomplete to make 
this analysis, "the remedy is not a trial de novo, but a remand to 
the agency for an additional record or explanation for its deci-
sion."119 
This review of an agency decision to release information ex-
empt under FOIA is much more limited than the de novo review 
of an agency decision to withhold information. 120 Limited review 
is in keeping with the full disclosure purpose of the FOIA. Permit-
ting de novo review of decisions to grant FOIA requests would 
significantly increase the time involved before those requests 
could be granted, and would also increase the requester's costs. 121 
These are particularly compelling interests under the TSCA since 
one of its main purposes is to provide the public with easy access 
111 Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1192 (3d Cir. 1977). The Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals again applied this analysis in GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. 
Safety Comm'n, 598 F.2d 790, 800 (1979). But see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. 
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971), where the Supreme Court stated "{d]e novo review 
. . . is authorized by § 706(2)(F) in . . . two circumstances. First, such de novo review is 
authorized when the . . . agency factfinding procedures are inadequate. And, there may 
be independent judicial factfinding when issues that were not before the agency are raised 
in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory agency action." 
120 One commentator has suggested shifting the presumption in favor of disclosure that 
is present in a regular FOIA proceeding to a presumption favoring non-disclosure in a 
reverse-FOIA proceeding. This would put the burden on the agency to show that there is 
adequate justification for disclosure. This suggestion assumes that by including the ex-
emptions, Congress intended to provide at least some protection for confidential informa-
tion despite the fact that it did not make the exemptions mandatory. Note, 
Administrative Disclosure of Private Business Records Under the Freedom of Information 
Act: An Analysis of Alternative Methods of Review, supra note 114, at 970-71. 
121 For an interesting analysis of the benefits of limited review of agency decisions to 
disclose exempt FOIA information, see Clement, supra note 114, at 636-37. 
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to chemical data. This procedure is also fair to the submitting 
businesses in light of the input they have in the original status 
determination by way of the substantiation they submit in sup-
port of their claim of confidentiality. It is reasonable for Congress 
and the EPA to expect businesses to make their best efforts to 
comply with the agency at the initial stage, rather than waiting 
to seek a full hearing de novo upon receiving an unfavorable 
decision. 
C. Disclosure to Congressional Committees 
The TSCA provides for very broad disclosure to Congress. It 
gives congressional committees access to all information reported 
to or otherwise obtained by the Administrator. 122 This is probably 
a recognition of Congress' broad investigatory-powers implied 
from it~ legislative function; the provision is not necessary, how-
ever, to give Congress the right to subpoena confidential informa-
tion.123 The Supreme Court recognized the necessity of a broad 
congressional right to obtain information in Eastland v. United 
States Servicemen's Fund, 124 where it declared "[a] legislative 
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of infor-
mation respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended 
to affect or change."125 There are limits to what information Con-
gress may request, but these are few in number and quite narrow. 
For example, Congress may not interfere with the guarantees of 
- the Bill of Rights in conducting an investigation.128 Nor may Con-
gress inquire into purely private matters which are unrelated to 
the subject matter of the legislation. 127 Outside of these limita-
122 15 U.S.C. § 2613(e) (1976). 
123 See Rosenthal & Grossman, Congressional Access to Confidential Information Col-
lected by Federal Agencies, 15 HARV. J. LEGIS. 74 (1977). The authors maintain that even 
in the absence of an express grant of access, Congress would have the constitutional 
authority to subpoena information. Since "it is questionable whether Congress could 
explicitly waive or impede its power to investigate, it is clear that a waiver should not be 
presumed from statutory silence." Id. at 88. Thus, in statutes such as the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(f) (1976), where Congress has not exempted itself from 
confidentiality provisions, the courts have still held that Congress' constitutional power 
to investigate permits it such access. Ashland Oil v. FTC, 409 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 
548 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
1
" 421 U.S. 491 (1975). 
125 Id. at 504 (citing McGrain v. Dougherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927)). 
121 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957). 
1
" Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955). In Shelton v. United States, 404 
F.2d 1292, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the court stated: 
In deciding whether the purpose is within the legislative function, the mere 
assertion of a need to consider "remedial legislation" may not alone justify an 
investigation accompanied with compulsory process; but when the purpose as-
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tions, Congress' investigatory powers are limited only to the ex-
tent that its investigations must serve a legislative purpose. 128 
In reviewing the propriety of congressional subpoenas, the 
courts have been extremely hesitant to refuse the congressional 
requests for information. 1211 Fearing interference with the legisla-
tive function, courts have limited review to two questions. One is 
whether the investigation is within the constitutional power of 
Congress. The other is whether the information sought is germane 
to the investigation. 130 It is clear that almost all congressional 
requests for information will result in affirmative answers to both 
questions so that a company challenging Congress' right to confi-
dential information will rarely succeed. 
Assuming that Congress will have access to confidential infor-
mation, the next question concerns the protections to he afforded 
the information once Congress has it. The House Rules provide 
for committee meetings to be closed to the public, but only when 
"disclosure of testimony ... would endanger the national secu-
rity or would violate any law or rule of the House of Representa-
tives. " 131 It is unlikely that discussion of TSCA confidential infor-
mation will be considered vital to national security or a violation 
of a House Rule. 
It has been suggested that any agency having confidential in-
formation requested by Congress give the submitting company 
ten days notice prior to disclosure whenever possible. 132 This 
would permit the company to present its claims for continued 
confidentiality to the committee and, when appropriate, to the 
courts. While the TSCA makes no mention of notice prior to 
disclosure, the regulations do provide for at least ten days no-
tice .133 
serted is supported by references to specific problems which in the past have been 
or which in the future could be the subjects of appropriate legislation, then we 
cannot say a committee of Congress exceeds its broad power when it seeks infor-
mation in such areas. 
11• Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). 
121 See Berger, Congressional Subpoenas to Executive Officials, 75 CoLUM. L. REV. 865 
(1975). 
130 Rosenthal & Grossman, supra note 123, at 100. 
"' House Rules Xl(2)(g)(2), (2)(k)(5)(A), and (k)(7), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 94-663, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 430, 435-36 (1977). These rules provide procedures for receiving 
information in executive session, but would offer only very limited protection to TSCA 
confidential information. 
112 Rosenthal & Grossman, supra note 123, at 106-08. 
133 40 C.F.R. § 2.209(b) (1979). Such notice was originally to be published in the Federal 
Register or to be by letter. The EPA, however, apparently decided that the Federal 
Register was an inappropriate method of giving notice to the affected business. In a letter 
dated Nov. 9, 1978, the Assistant Administrator said that notice will be provided via 
certified mail or telegram, and the Federal Register will not be relied upon to give notice. 
43 Fed. Reg. 53,817 (1978). See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra. 
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The court in Polaroid v. Costle 134 raised the question of whether 
notice prior to disclosure to Congress is constitutionally required. 
Recently, the court in Exxon v. FTC135 held that such notice is 
not constitutionally required, and suggested that a notice require-
ment might in fact cause other constitutional problems. "To im-
pose a mandatory notice period would skirt dangerously close to 
being at least the temporary 'equivalent to an order quashing 
[the official request or subpoena] which is generally an imper-
missible frustration of the congressional power to investigate.' " 138 
The main concern of the Exxon court was the interference with 
congressional investigations, but the court also considered the 
company's claim of a violation of due process. The court held that 
there was no violation since disclosure to Congress does not con-
stitute public disclosure. 137 Without disclosure, the court said, 
there is no deprivation of property, and hence no violation of due 
process. 138 
While the Exxon court acknowledged the value of the informa-
tion to the submitting company, the only protection it recognized 
for the confidentiality was the integrity of the congressmen. "The 
courts must.presume that the committees of Congress will exer-
cise their powers responsibly and with due regard for the rights 
of the affected parties. " 139 This is an attractive idea, but it is clear 
that for policy reasons more substantive procedures ought to be 
'"" No. 78-1133-S (D. Mass., filed May 23, 1978). See notes 49-55 and accompanying text 
supra. The Polaroid court directed both the EPA and Polaroid to submit briefs on the issue 
of the constitutionality of the TSCA's disclosure provisions. Polaroid, however, dropped 
its suit after the EPA promulgated regulations providing notice to the submitting com-
pany prior to disclosure of confidential information. 9 ENVIR. REP. (ELI) 1302 (1978). Thus 
the Polaroid court was prevented from discussing or reaching a conclusion on the issue. 
135 589 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
131 Id. at 588 (citing United States v. Amer. Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 388 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976)) . 
.., Id. at 589 (citing Ashland Oil v. FTC, 548 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). 
131 Id. at 589. See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra. 
••• 589 F.2d at 589. "We reaffirm our rationale in Ashland Oil that absent a showing 
that it is 'evident' that Congress intends to make trade secrets divulged to it by the F.T.C. 
publicly available, the Commission may, upon proper demand, release such secrets to the 
Congress without the necessity of prior notice to the parties involved .... " Id. 
This is consistent with the standards the Supreme Court had previously enunciated. In 
Watkins v. United States, 345 U.S. 178 (1957), the Court stated, "We have no doubt that 
there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure .... " Id. at 200. This 
broad declaration was given a narrowing interpretation two years later in Barenblatt v. 
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), where the Court refused to look into the motives of 
individual committee members and held that information might be supoenaed where the 
committee's legislative purpose was being served. 
The conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that exposure is not a proper legislative 
function and so disclosure to Congress for that reason may be denied. The presumption, 
however, is in favor of congressional responsibility and the invalidity of requests must be 
clearly shown by the submitting company. 
• 
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developed. The EPA must be able to guarantee the safety of the 
information it requires if industry compliance with the TSCA is 
to be achieved. It is also unfair and inconsistent to allow one 
branch of the government to disclose information which another 
branch acquired through a promise of confidentiality. Since 
members of the House and Senate are immune from civil and 
criminal liability under the speech and debate clause of the Con-
stitution, 140 some kind of procedure for guaranteeing security of 
confidential material is needed. 
A step in this direction was made in 1973 when the Senate 
passed the Congressional Right to Information Act141 which would 
have provided protection for "trade secrets or confidential com-
mercial or financial information." 142 The proposed legislation 
would have appointed the House and Senate Select Committees 
on Standards and Conduct to hold investigations of wrongful dis-
closures and recommend "appropriate action such as censure or 
removal from office or position. " 143 Chances of a public disclosure 
of this information would be greatly limited if the individual 
members were subject to such liability. 
If Congress does not adopt such legislation, it seems the least 
that can be done for protecting confidential information is to 
establish safeguards for the physical security of the information 
while in the possession of congressional committees. This would 
prevent inadvertent disclosure of the information, even if the 
danger of "leaks" is still present. One commentator has suggested 
that physical security may be more important than legislation 
governing "leaks" because "confidential business or trade secret 
information has rarely, if ever, been leaked."1u In the end, it is 
only fair for Congress to impose some restrictions and regulations 
on itself to ensure compliance with the legislation it has so care-
fully drafted. 
Ho U.S. CONST. art. I, §6, cl. 1. 
'" S. 2432, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 42101 (1973). 
Hi S. REP. No. 93-612, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1973). 
IU Id. 
'" Rosenthal & Grossman, supra note 123, at 114 (citing SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND 
INvF.sTIGATION, HOUSE COMM. ON INTERsTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, THE ASHLAND LITIGA-
TION: A CASE STUDY IN JUDICIAL DELAY OP A CONGRESSIONAL INvF.sTIGATION, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 46 (Comm. Print 1977)). 
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IV. ILLEGAL DISCLOSURES 
A. Measures Taken Within the EPA to Guarantee Safety of 
Confidential Information 
To provide EPA employees with guidelines and procedures for 
dealing with confidential information, the EPA published the 
TSCA Confidential Business Information Manual. 145 The Manual 
describes the responsibilities of employees who have access to 
confidential information and provides security requirements for 
EPA computer centers, contractors, and other federal agencies. 148 
Under these guidelines, as few employees as possible are to 
have access to confidential information. For an employee to gain 
access to confidential information, he or she must be recom-
mended to the Assistant Administrator. The Assistant Adminis-
trator evaluates the request for access on the basis of operational 
need. If the request is approved, the application is sent to the 
Security and Inspection Division (SID) which will investigate the 
person's background. 147 Upon clearance by the SID, the em-
ployee's name is placed on the list of persons authorized for ac-
cess. 
Once approved for access, each employee must sign a confiden-
tiality agreement. In this agreement, the employee promises not 
to disclose any confidential information to which he or she will 
have access. In addition, the employee acknowledges the criminal 
penalties to which he or she will be subject for wrongful disclosure 
under the TSCA. 148 Officers of other federal agencies must sign a 
virtually identical confidentiality agreement."' 
For purposes of the criminal penalty provisions of TSCA, con-
tractors of the United States and their employees are considered 
"
5 This manual [hereinafter referred to as TSCA MANUAL] was published in July, 1978. 
"' The manual also contains specific working guidelines for computer security, and sets 
out requirements to be enforced by the Security and Inspection Division (SID) to guaran-
tee the security of each facility using confidential information. 
m TSCA MANUAL at 14. If there is an urgent need for an employee to have access and 
a full security check has not been performed, the Assistant Administrator may request a 
waiver of the check from SID. SID will obtain a name check from the FBI and the Civil 
Service Commission while starting an investigation of its own. If the name checks reveal 
nothing that would prevent the employee's access, the employee will be granted such 
access. 
"' TSCA MANUAL at 39 (Appendix IV). This confidentiality agreement also acknowl-
edges the criminal penalties under 18 U..S.C. § 1001 (1976) to which the employee will be 
subject for making any false statement or concealing any material fact in the agreement. 
18 U.S.C. § 1001 provides up to a $10,000 fine or up to five years imprisonment or both 
for a false statement made to a United States department or agency. 
"' TSCA MANUAL at 53 (Appendix XIV). 
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to be employees of the United States. 150 Hence, they are subject 
to the same criminal punishments to which EPA and other fed-
eral employees are subject for unauthorized disclosures. Each of 
the contractor's employees must sign a special confidentiality 
agreement promising not to make unauthorized disclosure and 
acknowledging the punishments which may be received for mak-
ing such disclosure. 151 
Upon termination, each employee of the U.S. must sign an-
other confidentiality agreement. 152 In this agreement the em-
ployee states that he or she has returned all copies of any TSCA 
confidential information to the appropriate officer, and promises 
not to disclose any confidential information after termination. 
Once again the employee acknowledges the criminal penalties 
provided for disclosure and false statements to a government 
• agency. 153 
B. Criminal Penalty for Persons Illegally Disclosing 
The TSCA provides a fine of up to $5,000, imprisonment for not 
more ·than a year, or both for the willful disclosure of confidential 
business information by an employee of the United States who 
has access to that information by virtue of his or her employ-
ment.154 The federal employee disclosure of confidential informa-
150 15 U.S.C. § 2613(d)(2) (1976). 
151 TSCA MANUAL at 52 (Appendix XID). This agreement contains the following clause: 
I understand that under section 14(d) of TSCA ... I am liable for a possible 
fine of up to §5,000 and/or imprisonment for up to one year if I willfully disclose 
TSCA Confidential Business Information to any person not authorized to receive 
it. In addition, I understand that I may be subject to disciplinary action for 
violation of this agreement up to and including dismissal. 
Id. at 52. 
It is noteworthy that this agreement does not acknowledge the punishment under 18 
U.S.C. §1001 for willfully making a false or fraudulent statement in any matter within 
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States. It is unlikely, however, 
that this omission will shield a contractor's employee from liability under that statute. 
The courts have found five elements essential in sustaining a conviction under § 1001 
which would seem to be met by any misstatement by a contractor's employee. These 
elements are: "(1) a statement, (2) falsity, (3) materiality, (4) specific intent, and (5) 
agency jurisdiction." United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1287 (5th Cir. 1976). See also 
United States v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771, 773-74 (5th Cir. 1975). 
152 TSCA MANUAL at 40 (Appendix V). 
•a Id. There is no similar termination agreement provided expressly for the employees 
of U.S. contractors listed in the manual. It is unclear whether this was a conscious omis-
sion or an oversight on the part of the EPA in drawing up its manual. It should not, 
however, present a problem for the security of information submitted to the EPA to which 
contractors will have access; the pre-access agreement is enough to insure confidentiality 
in that it shows the employee has been informed of the criminal penalties for disclosure. 
UM 15 u.s.c. § 2613(d)(l) (1976). 
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tion statute is 18 U.S.C. § 1905, 155 but the TSCA specifically 
states that that section does not apply to TSCA information dis-
closures.158 The main reason Congress chose to write a new provi-
sion for disclosure of trade secrets under the TSCA was that the 
definition of confidential information in section 1905 is too broad 
to support TSCA's purposes. 157 
There are two main differences between section 14 of the TSCA 
and section 1905. The TSCA provides a much narrower definition 
of the information that may be designated as confidential than 
does section 1905. The TSCA, however, provides for a $5,000 fine 
as opposed to the $1,000 fine under section 1905. The legislative 
history·includes much discussion of the issue of trade secret defi-
nition, but there was virtually no mention of the change in the 
criminal fine. 158 Presumably, the higher fine is a recognition of the 
importance of the data to the submitting company and an at-
tempt by Congress to further deter disclosure. 159 
C. Remedies for Damages 
Once an unauthorized disclosure has been made there are sev-
eral options open to the ·affected company. The company may 
decide to sue the United States government, the contractor, if one 
was involved, the disclosing employee personally, or all three. 
The company might believe, however, that the publicity resulting 
from a suit would be worse than any limited disclosure that has 
been made, and refrain from taking any action. This section deals 
with the problems the affected company will have in pressing a 
1" That provision states that any employee of the U.S. who discloses any information 
coming to him in the course of his employment ... , which information concerns 
or relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, 
or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, 
profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or 
association ... ; shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more 
than one year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment. 
18 u.s.c. § 1905 (1976). 
151 15 U.S.C. § 2613(d)(l) (1976). 
157 See Hearings on ·s. 776, supra note 14, at 178 & 185 (statement of Jacqueline M. 
Warren, Environmental Defense Fund); Hearings on R.R. 7229, R.R. 7548, and R.R. 7664, 
supra note 9, at 88 (statement of Anthony Mazzocchi, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers 
International Union), & 354-55 (statement of Anita Johnson, Public Citizen's Health 
Research Group). See also id. at 460 (letter from J. Schneller, CIBA-GEIGY Corp.), 
stating that § 1905 is too vague in its definition of trade secrets and so would not protect 
confidential information enough; and note 17 and accompanying text supra. But see id. 
at 449-50 (letter from Ralph Engel) recommending that Congress incorporate § 1905 into 
proposed toxic substance legislation because it does provide such broad protection. 
153 See note 155 supra. 
151 The higher fine might also be a congressional reaction to inflation, although there is 
no mention of this in the legislative history. 
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claim for damage to its competitive position. 
1. Actions against the U.S. government-Under the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity, the United States government may not be 
sued unless it has consented to such suit by an express waiver of 
its immunity. 180 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 161 provides 
such a waiver by acknowledging liability "relating to tort claims, 
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individ-
ual under like circumstances." 182 
Under the FTCA it is clear that a business affected by the 
wrongful disclosure of a government officer or employee can bring 
a suit against the government. Such a suit would be based on the 
traditional theory of respondeat superior. Any recovery in an ac-
tion against the government is limited to actual pecuniary dam-
ages. No interest prior to judgment or punitive damages may be 
assessed against the United States. 163 
A far more difficult case for the affected business to bring 
against the government is one involving a wrongful disclosure by 
an employee of a contractor of the United States. The FTCA 
specifically excludes any contractor of the United States from the 
definition of a federal agency, 184 and the courts have consistently 
held that the U.S. is not liable for the torts of its independent 
contractors. 185 
One exception to this rule makes the United States liable where 
it has retained a significant amount of control over the day-to-
day operations of its contractor. 168 In very few cases have the 
courts found the federal government to have kept such control. 167 
The TSCA contractor situation is much like that presented in 
Logue v. United States. 188 There the Supreme Court held that 
employees of a county jail housing federal prisoners pursuant to 
a contract with the Federal Bureau of Prisons were not federal 
11
• United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976). 
Ill 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976). 
112 Id. § 2674 (1976). 
113 Id. 
'" Id. § 2671 provides "the tenn-'Federal agency' includes the executive departments, 
the military departments, independent establishments of the United States, and corpora-
tions primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States, but does not 
include any contractor with the United States." 
111 United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976); Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521 
(1973); Perez v. Untied States, 444 F. Supp. 623 (D.P.R. 1978). 
111 See cases cited in note 165 supra. 
117 One case where the government was judged to have kept such control is United 
States v. Becker, 378 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1967), holding that an independent firefighter 
flying a plane for the Forest Service who was subject to the regulations of the Forest 
Service, and receiving close supervision and control in flight, was a government employee 
for purposes of the FTCA. See also Witt v. United States, 462 F.2d 1261 (2d Cir. 1972). 
'" 412 U.S. 521 (1973). 
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employees. Despite the fact that the jail had to comply with the 
Bureau's rules and regulations, and although the United States 
had a right to inspect the facilities, the government was not au-
thorized by the contract to physically supervise the jail employ-
ees. Federal standards had to be met, but the government could 
not direct the operations. This lack of immediate supervisory 
authority prevented the jails' employees from being government 
employees. 189 
The EPA-contractor relationship is similar in that the EPA will 
be able to demand compliance with security regulations, 170 but 
nothing in its contracts permits it to supervise the ongoing opera-
tions of the contractors. For these reasons it is unlikely that the 
affected business will be able to successfully establish a link mak-
ing the government liable for disclosure by a contractor's em-
ployee. ,11 
2. Actions against the contractor-Claims directly against 
the contractor are the most likely route to recovery for the af-
fected business. 172 These claims are guaranteed by a clause in 
every contract between the EPA and its contractors which states: 
"The Contractor agrees that these contract conditions concerning 
the use and disclosure of confidential information are included for 
the benefit of, and shall be enforceable by, both EPA and any 
affected business having a proprietary interest in the informa-
tion. " 173 
It is unclear from this clause whether the EPA intended for the 
affected business to have policing power as well as damage re-
lief. 174 The right to keep an eye on the security of the contractor's 
119 Id. 
170 TSCA MANUAL at 27-32. It is unlikely that requiring the employees to sign confiden-
tiality statements and making periodic security inspections will provide the day-to-day 
supervision the courts now require for the imposition of liability on the government. 
171 The TSCA considers any contractor of the United States and his employees to be 
employees of the United States for the limited purpose of the applicability of the criminal 
penalty for wrongful disclosure. 15 U.S.C. § 2613(d)(2) (1976). It is unlikely that this 
would be held to be a congressional waiver of immunity for purposes of the Federal Tort 
Claims Act. If Congress had wanted to open the United States up to this kind of liability, 
it would have left out the limiting phrase "(f]or purposes of paragraph (1), ... " Id. 
172 While the affected company may win a judgment against the contractor, however, 
in many cases this judgment may be impossible to collect. The contractors of the EPA 
will sometimes be large chemical research companies with enough assets to pay a large 
damage claim. The contractors are, however, just as likely to be small companies or college 
students and professors who will be virtually judgment-proof. Interview with Steven D. 
Jellinek, supra note 37. 
173 TSCA MANUAL at 42. 
174 The legislative history, regulations, and TSCA MANUAL are all silent on the subject 
of security enforcement by the affected business. 15 U.S.C. § 2613(a) (1976) and 40 C.F.R. 
§ 2.211 (1979) deal with enforcement of the Act, but only in terms of regulation by the 
EPA. 
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operation and thus to object to an insecure system before disclo-
sure is made would be a significant one for the protection of the 
submitting company. The submitting company has the real inter-
est in protecting the secrecy of the information, and could proba-
bly do a better job of policing the contractor than the government 
is able to do. Balanced against this, however, is the contractor's 
interest in being left to complete his work without being contin-
ually watched and possibly harrassed by the submitting com-
pany. The contractor might also have to contend with defending 
suits for injunctions based on weak grounds, which would also 
interfere with its smooth operations. At present, it seems the EPA 
would be the party best suited to enforce the Act because it has 
powerful interests on both sides. On the one hand, it needs to 
guarantee security to receive the continued support of industry, 
without whose cooperation the Act would fail; on the other hand, 
it needs to give the contractors enough room to complete their 
work. 175 
An alternative to EPA policing of contractors would be for the 
EPA to establish a bonding requirement for all contractors. This 
would serve two purposes. First, the bonding company would 
have a stake in ensuring that confidential information is pro-
tected and thus could be expected to police contractor security 
procedures; this would provide a second source for policing of 
contractor security. 176 Second, the bonding company would guar-
antee recovery of a damage claim when the contractor itself is 
judgment-proof. 177 This guarantee would be beneficial in two re-
spects. First, it would ease some of the fears that submitting 
companies have about both security and recovery of damages. It 
would also make the EPA more likely to use the services of small 
independent contractors, which might be less expensive than 
doing the work itself or using the larger companies. In any case, 
the more satisfied the industry is with EPA precautions, the 
greater the degree of cooperation there will be in implementing 
the TSCA. The more flexibility the EPA has in implementing the 
TSCA, the less expensive that implementation is likely to be. 
3. Actions against the disclosing employee-In addition to the 
criminal penalties under the TSCA, the employee who discloses 
175 The EPA's policing of contractor security is presently conducted by the Security and 
Inspection Division. The EPA has a rigorous set of security standards which the contractor 
must meet before being given access to the confidential information, with special rules 
for computer use. In addition, SID may be requested by the Administrator to conduct 
inspections during the performance of the contract, and SID may make scheduled or 
unscheduled inspections on its own initiative. TSCA MANUAL at 26-33. 
m Id. 
177 See note 172 supra. 
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is subject to claims from two sources. First, he or she may be sued 
by the affected business for the harm he has done to the com-
pany's competitive position. Normally, this will be an unlikely 
route to recovery for the affected business, and thus will not be 
treated in detail here. 178 
Another potential source of litigation is from the United States 
government itself, which may sue for breach of the confidentiality 
agreement. Recently, in United States v. Snepp, 179 the United 
States sued a former employee who had published classified 
CJ.A. information in a book. The court allowed the United States 
to claim the proceeds from the sale of the book, 180 and enjoined 
the defendant from further disclosure of confidential informa-
tion.181 That case may be distinguishable in that the defendant 
was profiting from his breach of faith with the government, 
178 It would be a rare employee with assets sufficient to cover a judgment for the value 
of a disclosed trade secret. 
171 456 F. Supp. 176 (D. Va. 1978), aff'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 3527 (1980). 
180 In imposing a constructive trust on the book's proceeds in favor of the l.Jnited States, 
the court stated "One may speculate that ordinary criminal sanctions might suffice to 
prevent unauthorized disclosure of such information, but the risk of harm from disclosure 
is so great and maintenance of the confidentiality of the information so necessary that 
greater and more positive assurance is warranted." 456 F. Supp. at 182. The Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed this decision holding that the government's sole 
remedy was recovery of compensatory and punitive damages. 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979). 
In affirming the District Court's decision, the Supreme Court said: 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government the most appropri-
ate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. Indeed, as a practical matter, the 
decision may well leave the Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a 
publication such as Snepp's generally are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are 
a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable 
after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if recovered, they may bear 
no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust 
gain .... 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the Government and the 
former agent from unwarranted risks. This remedy is the natural and customary 
consequence of a breach of trust. 
The immediate threat to the United States is obviously lower with an unlawful disclo-
sure of confidential TSCA information than with the CIA security information involved 
in Snepp. In light of the necessity for industry compliance and the importance of the 
TSCA, however, the courts may impose a constructive trust on an employee profiting from 
his wrongdoing. 
181 In holding that the United States suffered more than incidental damages, the court 
said, "[t]his action involves a substantial wrong to the United States and to the public's 
interest in the effective functioning of its government." 456 F. Supp. at 181, aff'd, 48 
U.S.L.W. 3528 (1980). 
Although Snepp involved national security, and thus presented a greater threat to the 
nation than disclosure of TSCA secrets, the two situations are analogous in that both 
involve disclosure of information which the government has deemed worthy of protection; 
although the government may have narrower remedies available to it in the latter context, 
it should still be able to enforce its legitimate interest in confidentiality ofTSCA informa-
tion. 
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whereas it is not as likely that an EPA employee will have easily 
identifiable income from disclosure. It is, nevertheless, another 
sanction available to the government to ensure compliance with 
its regulations. 
CONCLUSION 
While the TSCA as administered by the EPA provides signifi-
cant protection for confidential information, there are several 
changes which can be made to improve the system. One of the 
most important aspects of the EPA's program is the provision of 
notice to the submitting company prior to the disclosure of confi-
dential information either to government contractors, Congress, 
or other federal agencies. While this notice may or may not be 
constitutionally-mandated, it is vital for achieving industry com-
pliance. Considerations of fairness seem to require the EPA to 
maintain its procedures for giving such notice even in the face of 
increasing administrative burdens. For these same reasons, a sub-
mitting company should be notified when a secret chemical 
identity's inclusion in the inventory appendix is divulged to a 
bona fide manufacturer of the same substance. 
Considerii:tion should be given to the discrepancy between the 
Act and the EP A's regulations as to the amount of notice the EPA 
will give prior to disclosure of confidential information pursuant 
to an FOIA request. The Act provides for thirty days notice to the 
affected company, and this may not be limited to the ten working 
days provided by the regulations. 
Congress should be encouraged to design regulations for its 
committees for dealing with agency-supplied confidential infor-
mation. The proposed Congressional Right to Information Act of 
1973 demonstrated that Congress is aware of the need for such 
legislation and would be a good starting point for this effort. In 
addition, it seems that the very least Congress can do is to de-
velop operating standards to ensure the physical security of confi-
dential information. This would show congressional respect and 
concern for the importance of the information it has asked indus-
try to provide. , 
With its procedures for ensuring security of confidential infor-
mation in the hands of government contractors, the EPA has 
provided significant protection. One addition to this security sys-
tem might be a bonding requirement for contractors, both to 
provide an additional watchdog over the contractor and to guar-
antee payment in the event of disclosure by the contractor or his 
employee. This would help close the gap left in the EPA's system 
which makes contractors liable for disclosure, but which provides 
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no guarantee that the affected business can actually recover on a 
damage claim. 
In designing this much-needed legislation for today's increas-
ingly industrialized society, Congress has struck a fair balance 
between the public's need for information, and the industry's 
right to preserve confidentiality. The EPA's program for the im-
plementation of the TSCA demonstrates both a high degree of 
respect for the concerns of the chemical industry, and an effort 
to minimize the burdens the EPA must impose. It is vital to the 
success of the TSCA that the EPA and the chemical industry 
continue to view their relationship as one of cooperation. 
-Paula R. Latouick 

